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Manchester School of Architecture
The creation of Britain’s National Computing Cen-tre (NCC) was publicly announced by Frank Cous-ins, the first minister of technology in Prime
Minister Harold Wilson’s Labour government, in March
1965.1 TheMinistry of Technology (MinTech) was created as
Wilson took office in October 1964, and it signaled his
administration’s commitment to his 1963 vision of an ultra-
modern Britain “forged in the white heat [of a scientific] rev-
olution.”2 The phrase “White Heat” became synonymous
withWilson’s government and is popularly used to character-
ize the scientific and technological boom of mid-1960s
Britain. Wilson’s vision of economic security by means of
technological advancement was central to the Labour Party
election manifesto of 1964. Manchester, popularly heralded
as the birthplace ofmodern computing, was announced as the
location for the NCC in December 1965.3 The story of the
NCC’s conception and development is one of initial political
urgency followed by almost a decade of little forward move-
ment. A small temporary building was hurriedly erected from
a design by the UKAtomic Energy Authority, after which the
UKAEA submitted proposals for an administrative tower,
which remained unbuilt. Eventually, the design of the perma-
nent building was directed by John Seward of Cruickshank &
Seward, whose initial architectural proposals were drawn
overnight between 4 and 5 May 1967. Construction was not
completed until 1975 (Figure 1). The NCC’s architecture
embodied what many scholars today call “technopolitics,” de-
fined by historian Gabrielle Hecht as “the strategic practice
of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or
enact political goals.”4
The British technology sector was bound up with issues of
rearmament during the Cold War, and it linked weaponry
with computation. The race to develop nuclear missiles cen-
tered on three new technologies: rocket propulsion, uranium
enrichment, and computation (first of missile trajectories,
later of guidance systems).5 Research and development for
each of these essential elements took place in the northwest
of England.6 Connections between the region’s research
and industry and the buildings constructed to support the
military and civilian applications of new technologies were
necessarily hidden, sometimes in plain sight. The NCC
was one small part of a regional military–industrial com-
plex that operated for decades in a “semi-secret entangle-
ment” with civil operations.7
In Britain, new construction for explicitly military pur-
poses was winding down by 1960 as the geographic focus of
the ColdWar shifted to parts of the developing world. None-
theless, the Soviet threat still informed British national policy.
Government expenditure on rearmament during the postwar
period outstripped spending on other national objectives.8
Archaeologists Wayne D. Cocroft and Roger J. C. Thomas
have suggested thatWilson’s Labour manifesto was partly in-
formed by the achievements of the Conservative administra-
tion in the preceding decade.9 In this essay, I, too, challenge
the narrative that a modernizing agenda of “WhiteHeat”was
exclusively Wilsonian, and, taking my cues from historian
David Edgerton, I seek to understand the role of what he calls
the “warfare state” in the wider built environment.10
To date, few studies have addressed militarism and com-
puting in relation to architecture in the United Kingdom.
Further, relationships among the postwar state, society, and
technology remain contested in the historical literature,
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particularly in discussions of the role of military advances and
civil applications. The popular view is that Conservative gov-
ernments were more willing to fund defense, while Labour
favored civil applications for research in the technology sec-
tor.11 Among scholars, the association between military tech-
nologies and advances in society has long been discussed. As
early as the 1930s, Lewis Mumford situated “warfare and in-
vention” and “military mass production” among his “agents
of mechanization.”12 More recently, science historian Robert
Bud introduced the idea of “defiant modernism,” a mixture of
national pride in British technological innovation and resent-
ment at the country’s loss of influence in the postcolonial,
postwar era; Gabrielle Hecht, referring to France’s postwar
nuclear program, employed the term “technopolitics,” as
noted above.13 Each of these frameworks is useful in explor-
ing the physical realization of architecture serving the British
military–industrial complex.
Expenditures for Britain’s nuclear program were often
disguised as funding for civil applications and hidden behind
the shifting ministerial structures of successive administra-
tions, including that of MinTech. As historians Jonathan
Hogg and Christoph Laucht note: “The institutional and
official tone set by a small number of scholars has led to a sig-
nificant proportion of atomic history being focused predom-
inantly on government and elites. . . . Top down histories of
the atomic age concentrate on Whitehall [Britain’s center of
government].”14 Hogg has suggested that “it is much more
realistic to talk about the existence of complex, intertwined
and localized nuclear cultures.”15 It is this regional clustering,
of civil and military research and technology and its correla-
tion with White Heat, that is of concern here.
With these four historical contexts in mind—the global
Cold War, Britain’s national modernizing agenda, the re-
gional clustering of defense technologies, and the local ex-
pertise in computing—I employ the idea of a mainstream
modern architecture in discussing the NCC building.
“Mainstream modernism”—similar to what others have
called “bread-and-butter” or “everyday” architecture—refers
to that generally unremarkable, nonmonumental modern
architecture found widely in Britain after the mid-1950s.16
While Reyner Banham disparagingly viewed such architec-
ture as “routine,” recent scholars have offered more positive
readings.17 Architectural historian Alistair Fair, for instance,
has described postwar British theaters as “embedded in the
realities of practice rather than the narrow terms of avant-
garde discourse.” He argues that through these buildings,
“it is possible to arrive at a more rounded understanding of
the period’s architectural history, one which includes a range
of designers rarely considered by historians.”18 The concept
of a mainstream modernism enables exploration of the mani-
fold external factors acting on the procurement and produc-
tion of various government buildings and allows us to
consider them in relation to British social, cultural, political,
and economic history. Studying Cruickshank & Seward’s
designs for the NCC might thus permit an examination of
the networks and the tangible relations between central gov-
ernment decisionmaking, local planners’ interpretations, and
architectural outcomes.19
Small-scale private dwellings notwithstanding, most
buildings are subject tomultiple factors and not shaped exclu-
sively by a single designer. For many of the building types
ushered in by the British welfare state, building standards
were developed and committees were convened to oversee
construction.20 Yet despite burgeoning building control leg-
islation, governmental design bulletins did not exist for weap-
ons production facilities or computer centers. Such facilities
housed novel technologies that demanded unique and spe-
cialized approaches. Buildings commissioned by the Ministry
of Supply were not subject to local planning processes and
were reasonably well funded. As one such building, the NCC
was a bespoke project without precedent. It existed between
the public and private sectors in its procurement and con-
struction phases, and this status was mirrored in its architec-
tural organization.21 Study of the NCC offers a particular
view of the interplay among central and local government,
public and private networks, and the interfacing of economic
and physical planning that other projects of the welfare state
do not provide.22
Figure 1 Cruickshank & Seward, National
Computing Centre, 1967–75 (private collection,
used with permission).
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As opposed to presenting a formal or stylistic analysis that
might view the NCC’s architecture as derivative and diluted,
characterized by “dreary stock solutions” and “faceless pack-
age deals,” I will unpack the variety of commissions and pro-
curement routes and the range and extents of public–private
enterprise that surrounded the building’s construction.23 I
will reveal the complex, interrelated networks that influenced
the NCC’s siting, mass, form, and materials as well as the
relationships among various government departments, local
authorities, private companies, public organizations, archi-
tects, developers, planners, and clients, as evidenced by poli-
cies, reports, finances, and schedules. I will examine the
region as a productive unit and argue that the geographies,
politics, and personnel involved had significant impacts on
the production of the NCC’s architecture. The architectural
firm of Cruickshank & Seward was but one of the many ac-
tors and elements that contributed to the building’s evolu-
tion, and the architects’ voices may seem diminished here.
I view Cruickshank & Seward, in effect, as a mediator in
a negotiated practice between “abstract rationalities” and
concrete realities.24
Networks, Narratives, and the Selection of
Manchester for the NCC
The architects’ professional experience was undoubtedly rel-
evant to the design and production of the NCC building, but
other actors and their networks were more significant in af-
fecting the choice of site, the pace of development, and the
eventual commissioning of Cruickshank & Seward. Chief
among these actors was Bertram Vivian Bowden. Bowden
was educated at Chesterfield Grammar School and Emman-
uel College, Cambridge. In the 1930s, he worked with Ernest
Rutherford, coauthoring papers on the properties of gamma
radiation.25 During the war he was posted to Washington,
D.C., and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to work
on the development of radar. In the early 1950s, he led a
British team in his role as principal scientific adviser to the
Ministry of Supply’s Telecommunications Research Estab-
lishment (TRE).26 On his return to the United Kingdom,
Bowden joined the UK Atomic Energy Authority.27 His
exposure to military technological research in higher edu-
cation shaped his collaborative approach, including his
eventual stewardship of the Manchester Municipal College
of Technology (MMCT), which was later expanded to be-
come the University of Manchester Institute of Science
and Technology (UMIST). In 1964–65, Bowden served in
Harold Wilson’s Labour government as minister of state
at the Department of Education and Science. His career
is part of a larger story that illustrates how policy, person-
nel, finance, and technology converged upon the city of
Manchester.
Bowden was forty-two years old and leading the computer
sales division at the Manchester-based electrical engineering
firm Ferranti when he was appointed principal of MMCT in
1953.28He directed the college’s expansion, its refocus on de-
gree-level teaching, and its renaming as UMIST, while Ar-
thur Gibbon, a partner at Cruickshank & Seward, oversaw
the new campus’s design (Figure 2). UMISTwas one of only
two new chartered institutions of higher education in Britain
focused on technological education and funded by the Uni-
versity Grants Committee from the mid-1950s onward (the
other was Imperial College London).29 Its development was
in advance of the Robbins Report (1963), which advocated
for the general expansion of the higher education sector.30
This report signified the need for regionally based scientists
and technologists to serve causes, such as the nuclear pro-
gram, that were not publicly stated.
Numerous and varied histories have been written on the
development of the computer.31 Most relevant here are the
networks of personnel involved in that development, their
genesis, and their location in Manchester. Bowden worked
with Freddie Williams, Tom Kilburn, and Peter Hall for the
TRE during World War II.32 Williams and his assistant Kil-
burn were electronic engineers who found themselves rapidly
without purpose in August 1945, as hostilities drew to a
close.33 They gravitated toward the University of Manches-
ter, where Max Newman, a Cambridge-educated mathemati-
cian, became professor of pure mathematics in 1945.
Newman appointed Williams as chair of the Electrical Engi-
neering Department in November 1946, while Kilburn was
“on loan” from the Ministry of Supply.34 By June 1948, the
assembled group of mathematicians and electrical engineers
achieved a global first in realizing Alan Turing’s “stored pro-
gramme” computing principle, in the machine now popularly
known as Baby.35 Shortly afterward, Bowden and Hall took
positions with Ferranti.
Atomic warfare was a powerful force shaping the British
government’s agenda in the late 1940s.36 The nation’s global
power and authority were diminishing even as its political
elite sought to reverse this course. In the United States, the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (known as the McMahon Act)
denied Britain any further collaborative role in the devel-
opment of atomic weapons. The Berlin blockade coincided
directly with the successful operation of Baby, and, as the
Cold War began in earnest, the British government prior-
itized the development of the computational power neces-
sary to calculate atomic bomb implosions. “Control and
funding” in the fields of aviation, nuclear power, and re-
lated technologies in military and civil contexts fell to the
Ministry of Supply, which became the largest single funder of
research in both domains.37 In October 1948, the Ministry of
Supply asked Ferranti to help build a computer designed by
Williams, Kilburn, and Newman, funded by the Ministry of
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Defence, and given technical support from the TRE.38
Bowden negotiated funding with representatives of various
government ministries during his time at Ferranti. He in-
formed the advisory committee to the National Research
Development Corporation that he aimed to secure further
monies for “a number of worthwhile research contracts” that
were peripheral to the development of the computer, if the
committee found this to be “in the national interest.”39
Bowden constructed strong narratives to support his
broadly socialist agenda. In his 1953 book Faster Than
Thought, he established the idea that Britain, and Manchester
in particular, stood at the center of the computer’s historical
development.40 His interest in centering new technologies in
Manchester was both public-spirited and privately endorsed,
as such technologies provided the foundation for the growth
of both education and commerce in the city. The networks
with which Bowden was engaged varied over time. His work
with Rutherford at Cambridge associated him with Newman
and physicist Patrick Blackett in the 1930s. His role at the
TRE with Williams and Kilburn took him to Washington
and MIT in the 1940s. His local industrial networks in the
1950s connected these earlier encounters, forged his path as
an educator, and ultimately led to his ministerial post in the
1960s.41 Bowden was not only able to influence histories but
also had the capability and inclination to lobby government
for support. His political adeptness no doubt contributed to
his eventual appointment to a cabinet position, which coin-
cided with the creation of MinTech in 1964.
One year earlier, Harold Wilson had famously captured
the mood of the nation in his White Heat speech (titled “La-
bour’s Plan for Science”) at the Labour Party Conference in
October 1963.42 There, he spoke of the need for research and
development, the imperative of a scientific revolution, the
importance of technological education, and the shared bur-
den of the state and society in achieving these goals.43 He
played successfully on the notion that Conservative govern-
ments under Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home
had languished in an “Edwardian establishment mentality.”44
This was resolutely misleading, as “the Conservative gov-
ernment embraced a rhetoric of modernisation,” and “the
Figure 2 University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, 1967–75, aerial view, ca. 1970 (UPC/2/527, Digital Collections, University of
Manchester).
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Cabinets of bothMacmillan and Douglas-Home contained
a number of ministers with strong modernising tenden-
cies.”45 In fact, the policy objectives of the outgoing Con-
servative administration formed much of the intellectual
agenda of Wilson’s own campaign and cabinet.
The computer industry was one of the core interests of the
newly formed MinTech. However, the possible applications
of computation to business and research were unclear tomost
politicians. Even when considered retrospectively by those
at its heart, the role of the ministry’s computer division was
described in ambiguous terms as “primarily, to encourage
the use of computers, whenever they could be expected to in-
crease the productivity ofmen, money ormaterials, and to of-
fer advice on potential applications . . . and, secondarily, to
assist the development of British computer manufacture.”46
This ambiguity signaled the hidden nature of an enterprise
that was actually geared toward advancingmilitary objectives.
The expenditure, which was disguised as being directed to-
ward civil research and development, aligned with Wilson’s
publicly stated objectives.
The United States, operating at the time from a much
stronger economic base than the United Kingdom, under-
took the majority of Western postwar investment in military
technologies. Its first significant investments in computing
were also attached predominantly to military objectives.47
France, Germany, and Britain realized that they had fallen
behind in an important technological race. Crash programs
and rapidly developed policies were deployed to close the
gap. This was a situation in which traditional political bina-
ries were relinquished; the overarching political culture of the
postwar era and its underlying value system was a shared
one.48 The rearmament program and the civil defense pro-
gram were inseparable, and the technological culture of Brit-
ain was underpinned by investment in military contracts.49
Policy drove commissions for weaponry, the forced mergers
of the Industrial ReorganisationCorporation, and the institu-
tion of new public–private partnerships.50 The Ministry of
Supply became the de facto sponsor of these contracts, but, as
Edgerton writes, there was also “a powerful, potentially com-
mercially exploitable, overlap between new military and civil
technologies, notably in aviation and nuclear power.”51
Architectural historian Reinhold Martin has referred to
the “aesthetic and technological extension” of the military–
industrial complex in postwar U.S. architecture as “the orga-
nizational complex.”52 In the 1940s and 1950s, large U.S.
companies in the technology sector—General Motors, IBM,
Bell Laboratories—employed high-profile architects and de-
signers such as Eliel and Eero Saarinen, Eliot Noyes, and
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill to deploy networked logic in
the design and assembly of their buildings and products.
Meanwhile, British technology companies and related gov-
ernment agencies failed to attract equivalent levels of capital
for architecture, and, amid the diminished economic and ma-
terial resources of the postwar period, buildings for new tech-
nologies were viewed primarily as mere vessels for the
activities they accommodated. The luxury of expressing cor-
porate identity through built form was restricted by scarcity
and diminished funding streams in a debt-ridden, resource-
starved, nationalized state. The drive to advance society and
develop new technologies was thus curtailed, and technology
companies and agencies were forced to optimize existing con-
ditions, particularly in regard to construction.
Yet the desire to progress despite adverse conditions was
accompanied by a distinct sense of pride, particularly in
manufacturing towns. Traditional engineering skills and be-
spoke component manufacture remained prevalent in the
production of high-tech objects in Britain. In certain sectors,
new technologies were perceived as being of inferior quality
if assembled from components whose manufacture was out-
sourced.53 Within Ferranti’s computer division in Manches-
ter, a city known for its engineering and manufacturing
traditions, each part was made on-site to maintain quality
standards, as was the case with earlier electrical technologies.
This rather nostalgic pride may have been a necessary diver-
sion in a society longing to be modern but forced by circum-
stances to depend on Victorian infrastructure.
Building for the Computer
Whether plans for the computer were civil or military, in this
period research in Britain was situated mostly at universi-
ties.54 The experts Newman assembled atManchester consti-
tuted one such research group, and parallel projects existed at
Cambridge and Birkbeck College, London.55 There was
some urgency in the computer’s development, a fact reflected
in the University ofManchester’s commitment to construct a
temporary building for the Computing Machine Laboratory.
The laboratory was instituted in 1946, and the new building,
designed by J. W. Beaumont & Sons (1949–51), was hur-
riedly erected when it became apparent that Williams’s
memory solution was ahead of similar research being con-
ducted at Princeton University in the United States.56 The
world’s first purpose-built building for computer research
was a simple two-story structure of load-bearing brick, spar-
ingly detailed across three structural bays—a basic container
for the sophisticated, and urgent, technological work going
on inside (Figure 3).57
Britain was slow to grasp the commercial possibilities of
the computer, and as a result, its investment in the design of
related products, branding, and buildings was sluggish.58
Things were moving more rapidly in the United States. An
example of advanced U.S.-based design for military tech-
nology was the 1943 Armour Research Foundation Metals
Building (now the Minerals and Metals Building) at the
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Illinois Institute of Technology campus in Chicago—Ludwig
Mies van der Rohe’s first building for IIT. This building’s
exposed-steel structure and glazed curtain wall lent it an
industrial aesthetic that set the tone for IIT’s modernist
master plan and other campus buildings to follow. Mies
was conscious of the relationship between his buildings
and technology and was later described as having “tried to
make an architecture for a technological society.”59 His
work on the IIT campus was well known and widely pub-
lished in European architectural journals, but its influence
was not evident in the schemes produced by local architec-
tural practices for the University of Manchester, which re-
mained relatively traditional.60
In 1964, an article in Architectural Record on Eliot Noyes’s
“building for machines” for Westinghouse, near Pittsburgh,
was titled with a question: “The Computer Center: New
Building Type?”61 Noyes’s scheme set a typological standard
of situating computer rooms at the center of the plan and, be-
cause of the scale and loadings of what at the time were com-
paratively huge machines, on the ground floor. Spaces for
computers were heavily serviced, and placing the computer
hall centrally made environmental control more efficient.
Most early computer applications were forms of advanced
calculations, often related to payroll and other information
that might be commercially sensitive. The enclosed nature of
computer rooms, surrounded by other spaces and often with-
out direct exterior access, thus offered enhanced security.
In Europe, it was the U.S.-based firm IBM that first
brought technology and marketing together in its architec-
tural commissions. Marcel Breuer designed IBM’s French
headquarters at La Gaurde (1957–62), employing a dynamic,
double-Y-shaped plan with two of its wings raised on pilotis
Figure 3 J. W. Beaumont & Sons, proposal for the Computing Machine Laboratory, University of Manchester, 1949 (University of Manchester Estates
Archive).
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above the sloping site. The building’s precast concrete façade
marked the first use of the Breuer-Beckhard system—
involving a variety of precast panels to create depth, decora-
tion, and character—which was later deployed in buildings
across the United States.62 IBM’s first UK commission, in
1963, went to Farmer & Dark, whose design for a lab and of-
fice building featured a squat eight-story tower with an adjoin-
ing single-story block set in the kitchen garden of a Georgian
mansion outside Winchester.63 Ultimately, the application of
new architectural materials and forms as a reflection of new
technology and branded identity was delayed in Britain; it was
not fully realized until 1971, when Norman Foster built the
IBM Pilot Headquarters building at Cosham.64
The Atomic Imperative and the Region
The NCC had its genesis in a military context. Defense-
related research during World War II, by both Allied and
German scientists, gave rise to the technologies that would
define the global geopolitical landscape for the rest of the
century: the nuclear bomb, the rocket, and the computer. The
U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the first controlled nuclear
explosion by the Soviet Union in 1949, and the outbreak of
war in Korea in 1950 all contributed to making rearmament
and civil defense central to British government activity.65
Welfare expenditure shrank and defense spending grew, feed-
ing the warfare state. It was against this background of a con-
tinuous state of preparedness for military engagement that
Britain’s nuclear and computing industries were born.
Directed from London, the Manchester-based NCC
emerged from an array of military–industrial facilities clus-
tered in various regions. These were products of war. As early
as 1935, the British cabinet discussed the flight range of Luft-
waffe bombers and the locations of munitions factories.66
Sites in northwest England were preferred because of their
distance from mainland Europe. Of the forty-four Royal
Ordnance Factories built during World War II, nineteen
were retained after 1945 for the peacetime production of
arms, including the nuclear program.67 As Julian Garratt ob-
serves, for production facilities, “a certain separation from
centres of population had to be balanced against the accessi-
bility of local labour.Within these constraints it was the prox-
imity of industrial and academic organisations . . . that led to
the selection of North West England as the key location.”68
The nuclear industry also required computers. Their use
in civil and military applications was already wide and varied.
Research and application went hand in hand. The connec-
tions between civil and military research were blurred, with
the outcomes of either affecting the other, and research and
commercial applications were similarly interconnected. The
University of Manchester ran a research reactor at the UK
Atomic Energy Authority site at nearby Risley, from which
the uranium enrichment program was overseen and where the
NCC had its first home. The Pegasus Mark I computer grew
directly from the work of Manchester university researchers
Kilburn, Turing,Williams, et al.; the Argus computer, built
by Ferranti at its site in West Gorton, Manchester, came
from research on control computers for guided weapons at
Wythenshawe, just south of the city. This clustering of
expertise and experience informed the decision to site the
NCC building in Manchester.
In 1965, Gordon Black was appointed as the NCC’s
first director.69 At the time he already held two posts: pro-
fessor of automatic data at UMISTand technical manager
for computing at the UKAEA site at Risley.70 The govern-
ing council of the NCC first convened in May 1966, with
members including Peter Hall (a colleague of Bowden,
Williams, and Turing at the TRE and a director of Interna-
tional Computers and Tabulators, later International
Computers Limited), Andrew St. Johnston (joint managing
director of Elliot Automation), Wilfred Scott (managing
director of English Electric-Leo-Marconi Computers), and
Murray Laver (director of the computer division of Min-
Tech).71 This group reflected the public–private enterprise
envisaged by MinTech, one established with central gov-
ernment funding but ultimately intended to attract its own
revenue from the services provided. As such, the NCC was
founded as a limited company.72
The functions of the NCC were described in London’s
Guardian newspaper as “set[ting] up a national library of
computer programmes and . . . carry[ing] out research on the
development of new programmes.”73 The development of
the NCC building ran parallel to the government-sponsored
mergers that created International Computers Limited (once
Europe’s largest computer manufacturer) from parts of
Ferranti’s operation; this further reinforced Manchester’s
position as the home of UK computing.
The exact location and details of the NCC building’s site
were revealed in January 1966.74 Situated alongside a new ur-
ban aerial (elevated) motorway (Link Road 17/7, also known
as Mancunian Way), the 2.6-acre site was adjacent to the site
chosen for the British Broadcasting Corporation’s new
northern headquarters on Oxford Road (Figure 4). Origi-
nally, in Manchester Corporation’s “Development Plan,”
which was approved in 1961, the NCC site was intended
to form part of the Higher Education Precinct; in 1964, it
was provisionally reserved for development by UMIST.75
Following a request from MinTech, however, Manchester
Corporation and UMISTagreed that the location was “ide-
ally situated for this important national project [the NCC
building].”76 The site’s ready access to major transportation
networks and its proximity to existing centers of corporate
and university technological expertise were clear reasons for
its selection.
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The site for the NCC building was at the intersection of
two major Manchester Corporation planning initiatives—the
Education Precinct and Mancunian Way. The Education
Precinct, running south along Oxford Road, was first con-
ceived as a part of the ambitious “City of Manchester Plan
1945,” which recognized the university’s value to the city’s
economy.77 The aerial motorway, a postwar highway project,
connected the city’s east-side manufacturing centers with its
west-side docks.78 As television programming and audiences
expanded, an adjacent site was allocated for the BBC’s new
northern headquarters. Finally, UMIST’s focus on higher ed-
ucation initiatives meant that “further education” courses
were moved to the newMunicipal College of Technology, lo-
cated across from the NCC site onOxford Road (Figure 5).79
Thus, the NCC’s prominent site stood firmly at the center of
the new Manchester, embodying the technological aims and
dynamism of the institution and its host city.
The contract for the first phase of the NCC building’s
construction was indicative of the urgent need to establish
and situate the agency. In January 1966, before the NCC’s
governing council was convened or the limited company
formed, MinTech officials proposed that the UKAEA act as
architectural agent on their behalf.80 The NCC’s Computer
Building, design and construction of which were overseen by
Atomic Energy Authority architect R. S. Brocklesby, was
the National Computing Centre’s first purpose-built archi-
tectural component—a near replica of the structure built
by the UKAEA at Culham, just south of Oxford, in 1960.81
Brocklesby and his team of architects carried out the first
phase “under considerable pressure,” with only a scant design
brief; the interior plans for the main building were “left until
the new board [could] be consulted.”82 The building as com-
pleted was a spartan box with minimal fenestration, clad in
dark-gray PVC-coated sheeting over a precast Bison con-
crete frame (Figure 6). Its two main floors accommodated
offices and a plant room on the ground floor with the com-
puter hall—surrounded by other spaces to protect against
industrial espionage—tape rooms, and operator rooms
above. A third floor featured large trusses that afforded space
for wide plenum ducts to move the large volumes of air vital
for cooling the computer. The supervisor’s office looked
through windows into the computer hall.
Construction of the Computer Building was already under
way as proposals for a second phase were published in the
press. Phase 2 called for an administration building that could
be extended at a later date—“a tower building to take offices,
computing libraries and conference rooms,” five stories at
first, expandable to twenty stories.83 At twenty stories this
would be “the tallest building in the educational precinct . . .
one of the focal points on Oxford Road next to Mancunian
Way” (Figure 7). Precast units would be “modelled to give
the building an interesting facade.”84 No drawings are ap-
pended to the minutes of the Town Planning Committee in
which the second phase is described, so it is impossible to
know exactly how the proposed building was supposed to
look.
Although it lacked a real program or design brief, the pro-
posed twenty-story NCC administrative tower must have
nonetheless satisfied the ambitions of HaroldWilson and his
associates at MinTech. It would have provided a new symbol
in a new district, representing new policies—theWilson gov-
ernment’s commitment to new technology and Manchester
Figure 4 Development areas for the University of
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology,
with site for the National Computing Centre near
lower right center (Area G), 1965 (TGB/2/5/3,
University of Manchester Archives).
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Figure 5 W. B. Heppell, Municipal College of
Technology, Manchester, after completion of
second phase, 1974, view from across Oxford
Road, with National Computing Centre at left and
BBC North headquarters at right (ZX-283,
Manchester Metropolitan University Special
Collections).
Figure 6 R. S. Brocklesby, original Computer
Building for the National Computing Centre, 1966,
with Mancunian Way at right (ZX-035, Manchester
Metropolitan University Special Collections).
Figure 7 Building Design Partnership, model for
proposed BBC North headquarters building,
Manchester, 1969, with proposed National
Computing Centre administrative tower (phase 2)
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Corporation’s dedication to establishing new industries in
the knowledge and service sector to replace the shrinking
manufacturing industries. Ultimately, however, the forces of
capital and financial controls exerted by the Treasury, exacer-
bated by uncertainty regarding the NCC’s specific functions,
resulted in the tower’s going unbuilt.85 Even after Harold
Wilson revealed Cruickshank & Seward’s design in 1967, the
arguments for a substantial NCC building, one that would
achieve the needs of both politicians and the organization,
were long drawn out. Manchester Corporation pressed the
NCC for resolution about when its headquarters would be
built, but, despite extended correspondence between Min-
Tech and the Treasury, this was never made clear.86 The
Treasury, questioning the logic of a building that seemed to
be too big for its program, concluded that Manchester Cor-
poration had put too much focus on prestige.87 The Treasury
wrote to MinTech to warn the ministry that the project was a
possible candidate for budget cuts in 1968–69 and 1969–70.88
Cruickshank & Seward
The NCC building eventually delivered by Cruickshank &
Seward was a direct response to these discussions and the
anomalies between the figurative representation and pro-
grammatic requirements. It essentially wrapped around and
enclosed Brocklesby’s original Computer Building of 1966
(Figure 8). The enclosing building had to be sufficiently sub-
stantial in stature and appearance to fulfill the vision of a na-
tional flagship project, yet modest enough to avoid being a
white elephant. Cruickshank & Seward was considered a safe
bet byMinTech as the firm had plenty of public-sector experi-
ence in university projects, most notably at UMIST.89 During
the postwar era, it was one of the preeminent architectural
practices inManchester, with a longer history than most other
local firms.90
The partnership between Herbert William Cruickshank
and Henry Thomas Seward began in Manchester sometime
between 1919 and 1923, and the firm they founded remained
active long after Cruickshank’s death in 1935.91 Their deci-
sion to found a practice in Manchester is believed to have
been based on the city’s position between their hometowns
(Aberdeen and Bournemouth) and its status as a major eco-
nomic center.92 Secondhand accounts portray Cruickshank
as principal designer and Seward as predominantly con-
cerned with the business end of things.93 Information on the
firm’s work before 1945 is scarce, but the interwar years were
apparently fruitful. During that period, when the practice de-
signed a series of civic projects, some won through competi-
tion, Cruickshank & Seward was generally successful, and
that success continued after the war. In this regard, it is one
of the few British architectural practices that bridged the
1939–45 hiatus in production.94
Cruickshank & Seward’s early civic buildings, including
work for colleges and hospitals across the country, were typi-
cally neoclassical in style; examples include the firm’s 1925
extension to theManchester Babies Hospital in Levenshulme
and its 1935 design for Southport Technical College.95 Its
early leisure and commercial buildings offered a clean, crisp,
pared-down take on neoclassical and neo-Georgian styles,
reducing details to subtle rebates on white ceramic tiles,
glazed bricks, and faience. Cruickshank & Seward build-
ings in Manchester that exemplify this approach include
the Ritz Ballroom on Whitworth Street West (1928) and
the John Line and Sons wallpaper shop on Peter Street
(1938) (Figure 9). The use of the color white, originating
in these early schemes, became a hallmark of the firm dur-
ing the postwar years.
Following Cruickshank’s death in 1935, Henry Thomas
Seward employed senior partners while continuing as the
firm’s principal. The office was organized into teams, with
the most prominent work going to Seward’s son John and a
talented young architect from Altrincham named William
ArthurGibbon (known as Arthur).96 John Seward and Arthur
Gibbon studied architecture at the University of Manchester,
which was well known for its faculty’s expertise in classical
and vernacular architecture. The two young architects were
also influenced by modernists such as Alvar Aalto, Le Corbus-
ier, andOscarNiemeyer. Seward was particularly interested in
Scandinavian design, and in the 1960s he and Gibbon visited
Denmark and Finland, where they met Aalto at his studio in
Helsinki.97 A Scandinavian influence, including the use of
relatively organic forms, is clearly registered in a number
of John Seward’s designs, such as his chapel for the Univer-
sity of Manchester’s Hulme Hall at Rusholme.98
As national policy fed the computer and higher education
sectors, Cruickshank & Seward began to obtain commissions
in these fields. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the firm slowly
and steadily built a reputation for good-quality modern de-
sign, with John Seward specializing in buildings for the in-
dustrial and technology sectors. His work for Ferranti built
on that of his father, as when he employed the crisp white
forms of the interwar years for a new administrative block at
Hollinwood (1968) (Figure 10). Seward’s team also designed
a series of buildings for International Computers Limited and
Sun Microsystems inWest Gorton during the late 1960s and
early 1970s (Figure 11).99
The specific circumstances of Cruickshank & Seward’s
appointment to design the expanded NCC building are un-
known. HaroldWilson visited Manchester on 5 May 1967 to
open the first phase of the NCC project and the adjacent
aerial motorway, Mancunian Way, at which time he made a
speech in the Renold Building at UMIST (Figure 12).100 This
building, designed and built under the direction of Arthur
Gibbon, was among Cruickshank & Seward’s finest work.
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Figure 9 Cruickshank & Seward, Ritz Ballroom, Manchester, 1928 (left), and shop for John Line and Sons, Manchester, 1938 (right) (m05514 and
m74738, Manchester Local Image Collection).
Figure 10 John Seward for Cruickshank &
Seward, Ferranti administrative offices,
Hollinwood, England, 1968 (Cruickshank & Seward
Archive, Manchester Metropolitan University
Special Collections).
Figure 8 Cruickshank & Seward, model for
expanded National Computing Centre, ca. 1969,
with Brocklesby’s original Computer Building at
center (Cruickshank & Seward Archive,
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It was one of the earliest podium-and-tower buildings in
Britain, and it cleverly addressed a significant drop in site level
between its north and south aspects. A generous, well-lit,
timber-lined hall was created through the use of innovative
prestressed, posttensioned bird’s-mouth beams that carried
the tower above and housed a band of clerestory glazing. The
building’s lecture theaters featured state-of-the-art acoustics
designed by Hope Bagenal along with top-quality, British-
made Rank projectors, which made the theaters technologi-
cally superior to other similar spaces in Manchester. Any one
of themwould have been a fine setting for a political speech on
progress. Wilson might well have been impressed by the
Renold Building and made aware of its designers by the
NCC’s leadership: Peter Hall was a friend of John Seward,
and Bertram Vivian Bowden, Wilson’s cabinet minister for
education and science since 1964, was Arthur Gibbon’s main
patron. The backdrop to Wilson’s speech was a painting of
a scheme for the main NCC building, hurriedly prepared the
night before by architect and painter Peter Sainsbury, after
John Seward’s drawings (Figure 13). By all accounts, Seward
and his assistant Stan Barker retroactively composed the plans
with reference to Sainsbury’s painting.101
As an organization, the NCC was never large enough to
have filled a twenty-story tower, yet it still required a building
of more space and gravitas than the original Computer
Building offered. According to the director of the Computer
Division atMinTech, “TheNCC [was] an important element
in the Government’s declared policy of seeking to promote a
rapid increase in the use of computers.”102 In Cruickshank &
Seward’s earliest drawings, the plan’s cruciform geometry
created a lateral extension to the site’s edges without produc-
ing too much floor space for the NCC’s still-undetermined
activities; the plan was as physically extensive as the site
would permit, without committing to unusable or unpro-
grammed floor space (Figure 14). The original scheme from
Brocklesby and his team was enveloped by the new building,
the old building’s exterior reclad with a dark-red rustic brick
to match the lower walls of the new construction. The pres-
ence of the adjacent aerial motorway and rising BBC head-
quarters building meant that the new NCC scheme had to
assume a particular height lest it be overshadowed by either
of these flanking structures (Figure 15). The resulting design
took the form of an inverted ziggurat, with the upper floors
cantilevered out above the lower ones.
City PlanningOfficer JohnMillar wrote that Cruickshank
& Seward had “adopted a deliberately reticent architectural
approach to avoid [the] building competing with the BBC
Regional Headquarters immediately to the north.”103 It
is unclear which BBC scheme Millar meant, although it may
have been an unbuilt 1967 design by Building Design
Partnership for a BBC North headquarters building
(Figure 16). Included inWilsonWomersley’s Education Pre-
cinct master plan, this, too, featured a cantilevered upper
floor forming an exaggerated colonnade facing Oxford
Road.104 The cantilevered upper floors were a reaction to the
Education Precinct master plan, allowing for access to ele-
vated walkways, which were proposed to connect the build-
ings to surrounding buildings and roads. This type of
comprehensive planning characterized British inner-city
renewal of the period and meant that buildings’ appearance
and form were often tied to, and influenced by, larger objec-
tives (Figure 17). The inverted-ziggurat form also afforded
the NCC building an almost overbearing muscular stature
that belied its limited interior space yet satisfied the desire for
an appearance of prestige.
Structurally, the NCC building was conventional, made of
reinforced concrete. An orthogonal square grid echoing the
building’s underlying frame structure extended across the en-
tire ground plan, with columns spaced on the nodes of the
grid as required. The gridded, white-tiled façade suggested
Cruickshank & Seward’s interwar-era work as well as com-
puter-age motifs and futuristic sci-fi aesthetics. The grid also
suggested themes of network and control, which were very
much on the minds of MinTech personnel as they conceived
Figure 11 John Seward for Cruickshank & Seward, International
Computers Limited Building, West Gorton, England, 1971 (Cruickshank &
Seward Archive, Manchester Metropolitan University Special
Collections).
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the NCC and sponsored the computer industry. The minis-
try understood that one of the social consequences of the
computer would be “much greater possibilities . . . for gov-
ernment surveillance of the individual.”105
The logic of the gridded façade extended both outside to
the hard landscaping and inside to the floor plan (Figure 18).
Outside, small granite paving stones picked out the column
line of the structure and extended it to the site’s perimeter
parking spaces on the north side. Inside, the ground floor, con-
sisting mainly of circulation and service space save for a lecture
theater, was arranged using the same grid; the upper floors
were less rigidly organized and walls were mostly partitions.
The only deviation from the orthogonal grid was the diago-
nally aligned landscape plan for an internal courtyard. This
court was echoed by a water garden located above the lecture
theater. Apart from the courtyard and the lecture theater, most
Figure 12 Arthur Gibbon for Cruickshank &
Seward, Renold Building, University ofManchester
Institute of Science and Technology, 1962
(author’s photo).
Figure 13 Peter Sainsbury after designs by John Seward, watercolor painting of the proposed National Computing Centre, 1967 (Cruickshank & Seward
Archive, Manchester Metropolitan University Special Collections).
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Figure 14 Cruickshank & Seward, National Computing Centre, early version of the ground-floor plan, 1967, with Brocklesby’s original Computer Building
at top center right (Cruickshank & Seward Archive, Manchester Metropolitan University Special Collections).
Figure 15 Cruickshank & Seward, National Computing Centre, ca. 1973, construction view with Mancunian Way at right, Municipal College of
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of the building’s enclosed spaces were plain and conventional.
Consequently, NCC brochures designed to market the build-
ing as a conference venue featured images of the courtyard,
with employees enjoying the sunshine outside (Figure 19).
Such marketing also pointed to the fact that, even at the NCC
building’s completion, its uses remained, in part, undeter-
mined. Nonetheless, the building’s gridded façade and stepped
profile became the branded identity of the NCC, its relative
drama on show while disguising a conventional interior—al-
beit one that named its meeting rooms and lecture theaters af-
ter the pioneering British computing machines: Atlas, Ace,
Deuce, Leo, Mercury, Orion, and Pegasus.106
The NCC building represented a negotiation between
central government objectives and local government projects.
It was also an architectural representation of technopolitics,
big enough for the site, big enough for Manchester
Figure 16 Building Design Partnership, proposal for BBC North headquarters building, 1969 (Building Design Partnership).
Figure 17 Wilson Womersley, master plan for
Manchester Education Precinct, 1967 (private
collection, used with permission).
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Corporation, and big enough forMinTech to appear credible
when the building was finally opened in December 1975, ten
years after the NCC was first established.
Computing, a Conclusion
The commission, design, and construction of the state-spon-
sored NCC building, spanning a decade when Britain was
successively led by Labour and Conservative governments,
somehow survived the typical culling by one administration
of the previous one’s pet projects. This may be attributed to
the project’s momentum, or it may point to a defense imper-
ative never publicly stated. As Edgerton observes, “There is
little linkage between the political salience of issues, and the
scale and scope of the state’s technological activity.”107 Either
way, the NCC building’s mainstream modernism obviated
simple political binaries.
The concept of mainstream modernism permits a reading
of government-funded architecture beyond the politics of left
and right—a political binary otherwise almost inevitable in a
discussion of the twentieth-century state and its architectural
production. It also provides a way to encounter the architec-
ture of the 1960s and 1970s without resorting to stylistic as-
sessment, in this case seeing the NCC building’s ostensibly
bland or diluted modernism as material evidence of the polit-
ical interplay embodied in postwar Britain’s infrastructural
modernization.
National, regional, and local actors all had powerful im-
pacts on postwar Manchester and its architecture. The NCC
building was a manifestation of central government policy,
yet its location inManchester was a product of regional struc-
tures. The site was a crucial piece of Manchester Corpora-
tion’s postwar urban schemes, requisitioned for national
interests, while the building’s form and materials were
Figure 18 Derek Lovejoy & Partners, landscape plan for National Computing Centre, 1971 (78018, Building Control Archives, Archives+, Manchester
Central Reference Library; redrawn by author).
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influenced by the interplay between national and local policy
objectives and infrastructures. The orbit of agents and the
orientation of their networks toward Manchester began in
the Telecommunications Research Establishment during the
war. The NCC was given a home in Manchester because of
the legacy of Turing,Williams, Newman, andKilburn, which
was, in turn, mythologized by Bowden, who perpetuated the
idea of Manchester as the birthplace of the computer.
Describing theNCCbuilding’s design in relation to the re-
gional military–industrial complex and the planning policy ob-
jectives of the local authority, and as a response to central
government agendas, demonstrates how mainstreammodern-
ism can help us understand alternative scales over time. Fur-
ther, the concept of mainstream modernism allows for a view
of the state and its activities beyond those embodied by the
oft-attached prefix of “welfare.” It addresses questions of how
we might consider the “differences between the exceptional
and the everyday,” and how analysis of the territories of state,
region, city, site, and building can be variously productive.108
If the NCC building was a metaphor for the competencies
and power of the Ministry of Technology and the rhetoric of
White Heat, the drawn-out process of its completion re-
flected the gestural nature of British policy.While the shining
white structure stood prominently against a new horizon and
signified increased investment in technology, its long devel-
opment reveals an alternative picture of postwar architecture
and its relation to policy and political objectives.
Richard Brook is an architect and historian whose research fo-
cuses on postwar mainstream and municipal modernism. He is the
author of Manchester Modern and an adviser to the Manchester-
based Modernist Society. His recent funded projects include an
examination of the intangible values of British postwar infrastruc-
tural landscapes. https://www.msa.ac.uk/staff/rbrook/
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